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Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB #1687 
Thomas J. Lloyd III, ISB #7772 
' ....... 
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT P.A. 
Counselors and Attorneys at Law 
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 950 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone (208) 319-2600 
Facsimile (208) 319-2601 
fshoemaker@greenerlaw.com 
tlloyd@greenerlaw.com 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL OISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER 
THOMAS ARNOLD AND REBECCA 
ARNOLD, HUSBAND AND WIFE, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
CITY OF STANLEY, A POLITICAL 
SUDIVISION OF THE ST ATE OF 
IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No.: CV 2014-35 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN C. ANDERSON 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS' 
MOTION TO CORRECT THE 
RECORD 
JOHN C. ANDERSON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over eighteen years of age, and am competent to testify regarding the matters 
set forth herein. I make the following statements based upon my own personal knowledge. 




2. I was the contractor for the construction work performed for Thomas and Rebecca 
Arnold on Lot 5 of the Mountain View Subdivision (hereinafter "Lot 5"). Specifically, the work 
I performed for the Arnolds on Lot 5 included construction of a retaining wall and the 
installation of the access driveway from Ace of Diamonds Street into Lot 5. In conducting this 
work I relied upon my extensive experience and expertise in earthwork and road construction, 
including my experience in performing similar work for the City of Stanley. 
3. I have been an earthwork and road construction contractor since 1978. I have 
constructed new roads as part of subdivision developments and I have constructed, repaired, 
rehabilitated, maintained and snow-plowed streets and roads located in several jurisdictions, 
including the City of Twin Falls, Custer County and Twin Falls County, among others. I am 
familiar with engineering standards for road construction used in those jurisdictions and used by 
the Idaho Department of Transportation. I have been the successful low bidder for both the 
Summer Streets and Roads Contract and the Winter Streets and Roads Contract for the City of 
Stanley and I am familiar with the policies of the City of Stanley regarding city streets. The City 
of Stanley has not had any engineering standards or specifications for road construction within 
the City of Stanley and the City of Stanley has not had any standards or specifications for the 
type of gravel to be used on any of the City streets. 
4. As part of the 2012 Summer Streets and Roads Contract, I repaired and rebuilt 
part of the Airport Road, which is the steepest street within the City of Stanley. The City of 
Stanley did not have any engineering standards or specifications for the construction of the 
Airport Road or other City streets and did not have any specifications for the type of gravel to be 
used on the Airport Road or other Stanley City Streets. Because the City of Stanley had no 
engineering standards for construction of City streets, I performed the work on the Airport Road 




usmg my extensive knowledge of acceptable standards for road construction within other 
jurisdictions and the work on the Airport Road was accepted by the City of Stanley. 
5. I also worked on the construction of the Stanley Town Square retail and 
condominium project located abutting the comer of Niece A venue and Critchfield Street in the 
City of Stanley in 2012 and 2013. The Stanley Town Square project included alteration of 
Stanley City streets (Critchfield and Niece), construction of an access drive from Critchfield into 
the Stanley Town Square private property, and placement of gravel on those streets. The City of 
Stanley did not require any separate permit for the construction of that access driveway, or for 
the use of those city streets for construction staging, or for the work done on those city streets, 
but allowed the work to be completed as part of a building permit for the Stanley Town Square 
project on the private property adjacent to the City streets. The City of Stanley did not have any 
engineering standards or specifications for the construction of that access drive from Critchfield, 
or for alteration of those City streets or for the gravel to be used on the City streets. 
6. The slope of the access driveway into Lot 5 is not an "extreme slope" as described 
by the City of Stanley. The slope of the access driveway is less than some of the other access 
driveways in the City of Stanley and much less than the slope of the Airport Road in Stanley. I 
constructed the access driveway into Lot 5 at the end of Ace of Diamonds using the same 
methods and standards that I used for the Stanley City streets while I was the streets and roads 
contractor for the City of Stanley. 
7. Further, during excavation work for the construction of the retaining wall that I 
installed on Lot 5 I stockpiled topsoil and other vegetation. A photograph of the topsoil and 
other vegetation that I stockpiled in construction of the retaining wall on Lot 5 is shown on 




page 54 of the Agency Record 1. All of the topsoil and vegetation shown in this photograph was 
removed from Lot 5, so the City of Stanley's statement on page 54 of the Agency Record that the 
stockpile was "[t]opsoil and vegetation including that removed from city property" is false. In 
fact, there was no vegetation or topsoil on the City property at the end of Ace of Diamonds that 
could have been removed or utilized. The material at the end of Ace of Diamonds was rock, 
gravel and concrete residue from another landowner's contractor who washed out his concrete 
truck at the end of the street. None of the Stanley City officials were present on the job site at 
the time the topsoil and vegetation was removed from Lot 5 and placed in the stockpile shown on 
page 54 of the Agency Record. 
Further your Affiant saith naught. 
J;&.one. ~ 
ft\. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this .5 day of October, 2015. 
Notary Publi'so~aho 
Residing at ( Se.. 
Commission Expires S: .. 31-~()( 8:' 
1 References in this Affidavit to "Agency Record" or "AR" shall mean and refer to the Agency Record, consisting of 
108 numbered pages, as filed in Case No: CV 2014-35 in the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Custer. 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of October, 2015 I served a true and correct copy of 
the following documents, under the method indicated below: 
Paul J. Fitzer 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Defendant 
D U.S. Mail 
D Facsimile 
IZ! Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Delivery 
D E-mail: pjf@msbtlaw.com 
Fredri V. Shoemaker 
Thomas J. Lloyd 




Oct/12/2015 12:17:58 PM ,.....____ Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke 2083311202 -
Paul J. Fitzer. ISB # 5675 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CI-ITD. 
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 331-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202 
Email: piflalmsbtlaw.com 
Attorney for the City of Stanley 
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IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER 
TOM and REBECCA ARNOLD, ) 






CITY OF STANLEY, a political ) 
subdivision of the State of Idaho, ) 
) 
Resp011de11t. ) 
Case No. CV-14-00035 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO STRIKE PETITIONER'S 
MOTION TO CORRECT RECORD AND 
SUPPORTING AFFIDAVITS 
COMES now, the Respondent, City of Sta11ley, by and tlu·ough its co1.msel of record, 
Paul Fitzer, of MOORE SMITH BUXTON TURCKE, CHTD., hereby submits this 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Petitio11er' s Motion to Correct Record. 
A. 
I. ARGUMENT 
Petitioner's attempt to augment the record with extrinsic evidence however 
clothed is untimely. 
Petitioner claims that she is merely attempting to correct incorrect and/or false 
statements made within the Agency Record and within the Respondents' brief and/or at oral 
argument. She is doing nothing of the kind, b1.1t is rather submitting questionable testimony not 
ORIGll~AL 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO Sl'RlKE PETITIONER'S MOTION TO CORRECT 
RECORD-I 
206 
Oct/12/2015 12:17:58 PM Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke 2083311202 ,_ ~ 
subject to cross~examination and other spurious factual and legal assertions. Her motion and 
supporting affidavits are frreleva11t and untimely a11d offered for an improper purpose. 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(e), "[w]hen judicial review is authorized by statute, review of 
agency action shall be based upon the record created before the agency.'' While a court may in 
certain limited circumstances admit additional evidence when "the authorizing statute provides 
that the district may take additional evidence itself1 there is 110 such statute in this instai1ce and 
regardless, I.R.C.P. 84(1) allows fol' the augn:ientation of the record only "within twe11ty-011e 
days of the fili11g of the settled transcript and record." The rules are unequivocal and extrinsic 
evide11ce offered after this Court's Decision and Order Re: Judicial Review of Building Permit 
Applicatio11 Denial (''Order'') is absurdly untimely. 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(n) and (1), faih.u·e to timely object to a record/ transcript 
constitutes a waiver of the right to contest the same. Additionally, an m1timely motion 
to co1Tect the record is s1.ibject to sanctions as the district Court deems appropriate, 
including dismissal. Idaho Rule of Civil ProcedlU'e 84(11) provides that: 
Failure of a party to timely take any other step in the process for judicial review 
shall not be deemed jurisdictional, but may be grounds only for such other action 
or sanction as the district court deems appropriate, 1,1,hich may include dismissal 
of the petition for review. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(1) provides that: 
Any party desiring to augment the transcript or record with additional materials 
presented to the agency may move the district court within f\1,enty-one (21) days 
of the filing o/the settled transcript and record 
Where statute provides for the d,tstrict court itself to take additional evidence, the 
party desiring to present additional evidence must move the court to do so within 
rwenty~one {21) days of the filing of the transcript and record with the district 
court. 
The Petitioner's October 6, 2015 Motion to Correct the Record was filed more than twenty~one 
(21) days after the filing of the settled trnnscdpt and record. The notice oflodging of the 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE PETITIONER'S MOTION TO CORRECT 
RECORD-2 
207 
UCU'l2/ZU1~ 12'.17'.5B 1-'M Moore Sm,m auxmn a iurcKe ~tle33t 1~M 
,--._ - 71'9 
agency record was filed April 18 2014 and deemed settled on May 1, 2014. In fact, Petitioner 
not only waited until after the deadline for objecting to the record, but did not file 01· serve its 
objections m1til after the Court's final decision which was filed on Jime 10, 2015; a full year, 
five months and five days after the settling of the record/ transcript and after a year's worth of 
briefing and oral argument. 1 Therefore, Petitioner's Motion to Col'rect Record is u11ti111ely a11d 
their objections are waived. 
As expressed it1 the Respo11de11t's Response to Petitio11er'.s Objectio11 to Respondent's 
Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs and Petition for rehearing filed contemporaneously 
herewith and incorporated herein, the Petitioner's lawsuit had 110 merit in the first place. 
Respondents have already expended significant funds and time to defend agaillst Petitioner's 
multiple frivolous claims. The Court ruled in favor of Respondent in its Jtme 10, 2015 Order. 
In part, the Court found that Petitioner caused her own financial setbacks by failing to follow 
established city ordinance procedures before begitming construction. Petitioner expected the 
City to bear the brunt of those costs. Now, with this Motion, additional expense al'ld time will 
be necessary in order to defend against Petitioner•s U11timely request to correct the record and 
submit additional arguments and objections. Additio11ally, if ultimately said request(s) were 
granted, the record will 11eed to be augmented at eve11 more expettse and time expended in order 
to allow the Respondent to respond to Petitioner's spurious factual and legal conclusions. This 
is precisely why the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide strict temporal remedies and 
protections from such untimely filings as delineated in Respondenfs axgument above. 
1 Respondent's responsive brief to Petitioner's opening brief was filed on July 24, 2014. Petitio11er's objections 
therefore would have been due in their reply brief and/or at the oral argument. Petitioner was granted two 
extensions of time to file their reply, ultimately filed on September 19, 2014. Oral argument was held on May 20, 
2015 and the Comt's final decision was issued on June 10, 2015. Petitioner filed and delivered to Respondent its 
Motion to Correct Record and supporting documents on October 6, 201S, well after the deadline to file or serve its 
objections within the mandatory timeframe. Accordingly, Petitioner's Motiot1 to Cor!'ect Record as to extrinsic 
evide11ce and Petitio11er's allegations of incorl'ect and/or false statements are untimely and their objections nre 
waived, I.R.E. 6!3(b). 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STnIKE PETITlONER'S MOTION TO CORRECT 
REC08.D-3 
208 
Oct/12/2015 12:17:58 PM _ Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke 20833112~ 
' ' 
8/9 
Accordingly, the Courf s review is and always correctly was confined to the administrative 
record in this case. 
II. CONCLUSION 
Resp011dents are entitled to an order striking the Motio11 to Correct Record and 
Supporting Affidavits from the record and are entitled to additional costs and fees for defending 
Petitioner's untimely arguments and objections. 
DATED this..1_2-eayofOctober, 2015. 
Moo;iH BUXTON & TURCK!l, CHARTERED 
.. / 
j/ 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE PETITIONER'S MOTION TO CORRll:CT 
RECORD-4 
209 
Oct/12/2015 12:17:58 PM .--._,_ Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke 20833112~ 9/9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the/ '--aay of October, 2015 1 a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was served as follows: 
TomLJoyd 
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 
OBERRECHT. P.A. 
950 W Bannock St. Ste 950 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Hon, Judge Alan C. Stephens 
District Cou1t 
210 Courthouse Way1 Suite 120 
Rigby, ID 83442 
Hon. Judge Alai1 C. Stephens 
C/0 Custer County District Court 
PO Box 385 
















' ustercountvcourtta.l ail.com 
MEMORANDUM lN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STR.lKE PETITIONER'S MOTION TO CORRECT 
RECORD-S 
210 
OCUl:i/201:! 12'.17:'58 PM Moore Smith Buxton & TurcKe 2u~31120~ 
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Paul J. Fitzer, ISB # 5675 
MOORE SMrTH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
950 West Ban11ock Street, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 331-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202 
Email: pjf@msbtlaw.com 
Attorney for the City of Stanley 
'' ', 
"!"--
·-, J c···. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER 
TOM and REBECCA ARNOLD, 
husband and wife, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
CITY OF STANLEY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV-14-00035 
) 
) RESPONDENrs NOTICE OF OBJECTION 
) AND MOTION TO STR1KE PETITIONER'S 
) MOTION TO CORRECT RECORD AND 
) AFFIDAVITS OF REBECCA W. ARNOLD 
) AND JOHN C. ANDERSON FILED ON 
) OCTOBER 6, 2015 
__________ R_es_._p_o_11d_e_n_t._ ) 
COMES now, tl1e Respondent, City of Stanley, by and through its counsel ofrecord; Paul 
Fitzer, of MOORE SMITH BUXTON TURCKE, CHTD., hereby moves this Court for an order 
to strike the Petitioner's Motion to Correct the Record and Affidavits of Rebecca W. Arnold, and 
John C. Anderson filed on October 6, 2015 pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(f) and I.R.C.P. 84(e ), (]), and 
(n). This motio11 is based upon the records and pleadings 011 file hereh1 and supported by 
Respondents' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Petitioner>s Motion to Correct 
MOTION TO STRIKE - 1 
_,-,. ... I t'""\lf\l \' , ·. '·«· t .< ·<: r "' I I • •, ...... t · .. ,, 
211 
v1..Lt 1£1.t:u.1;:J ·1L:'J ,.:oa t-'M Moore smith Buxton & iurc1<e 2oa3311202 3/9 
Record and Supporting Affidavits. Defendants request attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho 
Code §§ 12-117 and I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(l) and a11y other relief deemed appropriate by the Court. 
cf--' 
DA TED this -1...f: day of October, 2015. 
Attorney for Respondent, City of Stru1ley 
MOTION TO STRIKE - 2 
212 
Uwl/ IL./£U Iv IL:,, :oer t-'M Moore ~m,rn Buxton &TurcKe 2oa~:s11202 4/9 
~ -· 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that 011 the f 2-day of October, 2015, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO STRIKE by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Tom Lloyd 
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 
OBERRECHT, P.A. 
950 W Bannock St, Ste 950 
Boise, ID 83702 
Ho11. Judge Alan C. Stephens 
District Court 
210 Courthouse Way, Suite 120 
Rigby, ID 83442 
Hon. Judge Alan C. Stephens 
C/0 Custer County District Coiut 
PO Box 385 
Challis, ID 83226 






Facsimile: (208) 745-6636 
Hand-delivel'ed 






_x_ E-Mail: ~ck~e~s.!Jatl~e1~· ~q=.=== 
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Paul J. Fitzer, ISB # 5675 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 331-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202 
Email: pif@msbtlaw.com 
Attorneys for the City of Stanley 
I ~-' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER 
TOM and REBECCA ARNOLD, 
husband and wife, 
Petitioners, 
V. 
CITY OF STANLEY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV-14-00035 
) 
) 
) RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S 
) OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT'S 
) MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEE'S 
) AND COSTS AND PETITION FOR 
) REHEARING 
__________ R_e~sp-o_n_d_en_t_. __ ) 
CITY OF STANLEY, by and through their attorneys of record, MOORE SMITH BUXTON 
& TURCKE, CHARTERED, submit its Response to Petitioner's Objection to Respondent's 
Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs and Petition for Rehearing. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Petitioner Rebecca Arnold ("Arnold") does not specifically object to the itemization of 
any of the requested attorney fees and costs pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6) and 54(e)(3) and 
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54(e)(6) and any such specific objection is therefore deemed waived. 1 Rather, the sole remaining 
objection is limited to an award of attorney fees pursuant LC. § 12-117; that Arnold proceeded 
with a reasonable basis in fact and law. Arnold's legal theory is that a lot, presumably every lot, 
in a duly approved and platted subdivision that happens to abut a street, regardless of the terms 
and conditions of the plat itself, possesses a preexisting "vested right" "appurtenant to the land" 
to access the public way as "one of the incidents of ownership of land". The City is therefore 
powerless "to cut off this right of ingress and egress [which] would be to take2 the lot owner's 
property without due process of law."3 
Arnold further asserts that the City has never enacted any ordinances entitling the City 
through its police powers to either require a building permit to construct a road access and/or 
require the submission of technical information in support of such an application in order to 
protect the public health and safety. Arnold concludes by stating that this Court's Decision and 
Order Re: Judicial Review of Building Permit Application Denial ("Order") flat out ignores and 
"runs afoul of a long history of Idaho law that has been set forth in over a century's worth of case 
law".4 Respectfully, this Court was correct. Arnold mispresents applicable case law by taking 
partial excerpts of case law out of its legal context, historical context, and claiming its principles 
apply in modern subdivision law. 
1 See I.R.C.P. 54 (d)(6) and (e)(3) and (6); I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) requires that the court consider numerous factors in 
determining the amount of attorney fees in a civil action. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). "While the district court does not have to 
'address all of the I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) factors in writing, the record must clearly indicate the court considered all of the 
factors."' Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Quail Ridge Medical Investor, LLC, 339 P.3d 1136 (Idaho 2014); Hurtado v. 
Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 23,278 P.3d 415,425 (2012) (quoting Lee v. Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5, 11, 189 
P.3d 467,473 (2008)). 
2 It should be noted that this is not takings cause of action. 




With regard to Petitioner's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Rehearing 
"Rehearing") and Motion to Correct the Record, Arnold has undertaken a personal attack against 
the City referencing "[m]aterial errors of fact and law advanced by the City", "gross 
mischaracterizations", "barren assertions during oral argument", "lobbed accusations of criminal 
and otherwise illegal conduct" and "prejudice" "stemming from untruths". Believing the Court 
cannot review the record for itself, Arnold hypocritically accuses the City Attorney of leading 
the Court astray. Such unprofessionalism does not warrant a response other than to point out that 
Arnold's outright rude accusations and misrepresentation of the facts and law have no reasonable 
basis in fact, law, or in a courtroom. If anything, Arnold's Petition to Rehear bolsters a finding 
that attorney fees should be awarded. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Arnold's contention that each lot in an approved subdivision that abuts a city street 
has a vested right appurtenant to the land to access that street even in contravention 
to an approved subdivision plat lacks a reasonable basis in fact and law. 
Arnold blatantly misrepresents the law by asserting that a city is compelled to grant a 
secondary access to a lot within an approved subdivision by virtue that the lot is adjacent to a 
city street; that such a right is a vested right appurtenant to the land. Arnold berates both this 
Court and the City for ignoring "over a century's worth of Idaho law"5 in opining that a right of 
access exists "where a lot is otherwise landlocked"6 or where there is no other reasonable 
alternate access. Arnold concludes that there is no legal support for this "unfounded deviation 
5 Rehearing, p. 6; Objection, p. 5. 




from the ... long standing law ofldaho".7 It is Arnold who chooses to ignore the entirety of case 
law in the modern era taking excerpts of several cases out of context to support her conclusion. 8 
Arnold relies upon Johnson v. Boise City, 87 Idaho 44, 51, 390 P.2d 291, 294 (1964) 
wherein the owner of two parcels (both of which enjoyed vehicular access to the city street) 
sought to enjoin the City of Boise from closing the curb cuts/ driveways and reconstructing the 
curb pursuant to its police powers in order to eliminate vehicular access from the street to the 
property for public safety and parking considerations. Id; 87 Idaho at 48. Arguably running 
afoul of I.R.C.P. I l(a)(I) Arnold quotes only the introductory statements of the Idaho Supreme 
Court's analysis; specifically the generic statement that "access to a public way is one of the 
incidents of ownership of land bounding thereon. Such right is appurtenant to the land and is 
vested right." Id; 87 Idaho at 51. Arnold twists this maxim to purportedly apply to a lot within a 
subdivision with an alternate access already provided pursuant to an approved final plat. 
Arnold conveniently left out the very next paragraph which provided that "this right of 
access, however, may be regulated, for it is subservient to the primary rights of the public to the 
free use of the streets for travel and incidental purposes." Id. The substance of the Johnston 
opinion and the myriad of others that follow is the Court's reiteration that a municipality's police 
power to police the streets and regulate the traffic thereon outweighs incidental injury to an 
individual property owners' right to access the right of way. Id; at 52. If the exercise of authority 
"bears a reasonable relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, such 
7 Objection, p. 6. 
8 JTD v. HI Boise, LLC, 153 Idaho 334,282 P.3d 595 (2012); Lochsa Falls, LLCv. !TD, 147 Idaho 232,207 P.3d 
963 (2009); Killinger v. Twin Falls Highway Dist., 135 Idaho 322, 17 P.3d 266 (2000); 
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enactment would be valid within the inherent powers of the legislative body". Id; at 52. As the 
Court noted: 
This case presents the problem of reconciling the conflicting interests of the 
public with that of the abutting owner. Under its exercise of the police power and 
authority over the streets and in furtherance of the public good, the [ city council] 
for sufficient reason, can eliminate these curb cuts and the driveways without 
incurring liability to the abutting owner for the resulting injury. 
Id; at 51. Contrary to Arnold's contention that the City and this Court's observation that Lot 5 
is not landlocked ignores a century of case law, the Court's analysis in Johnson and other 
precedent foc_uses on the existence or non-existence of alternate or secondary accesses to an 
otherwise land-locked property; 
As concerns the Bannock street premises, there exists access from the street to the 
premises for pedestrian traffic not only from Bannock street and Eleventh street, 
but also from the alley, vehicular traffic presently has access from Eleventh street 
and potentially from the alley. 
Id; at 53. The Supreme Court then adopted this rule of law: "Where the abutting owner had 
other means of access, the right of access may be denied by a police regulation." Id 
Emphasis Added. Incidentally, Johnston carefully noted that this was not a takings analysis as 
the land-owners were not seeking damages at all. 
... the problem presented here is not a question of taking under the authority of 
eminent domain with payment of compensation; the problem is simply whether 
the city may proceed in the closing of these curb cuts under its 'police powers', 
regardless of payment of compensation. Appellant merely seeks a permanent 
injunction against the exercise of this power; he is not seeking damages. 
Id, at 52. In short, Arnold takes the Johnston excerpt out of context. The Johnson Court was 




including those cases cited by Arnold to wit: Village of Sandpoint v. Doyle, 14 Idaho 749, 95 P. 
945 (1908), Farris v. City of Twin Falls, 81 Idaho 583, 347 P.2d 996 (1959 and Continental Oil 
Co. v. City of Twin Falls, 49 Idaho 89, 286 P. 353 (1930). All of these cases are easily 
distinguished from the present case. 
The significance is that first; none of these cases pertain to a mere lot within a duly 
approved subdivision. Second, these cases unlike in Johnston and here, pertain to abutting 
property owners that were completely deprived of access to any ingress / egress. The challenged 
municipal activity or regulation completely "cut off' any access whatsoever to their property: In 
Doyle it was the Village of Sandpoint's bridge: 
... the village here constructed its bridge on the side of its right of way next to 
[Doyle's] property and caused the bridge to adjoin the front of [Doyle's] lot. It 
therefore cut him off from his previous right of access to the street on its natural 
surface and left him without any means of egress and ingress at all, unless he can 
go over the bridge." 
14 Idaho at 759-760. Emphasis added. In Farris, the City of Twin Falls negligently constructed 
a curb that raised Washington Street eight inches above its previous location leaving the adjacent 
buildings eight inches lower than the level of the street thereby wholly "cutting off' any access 
to the street. 81 Idaho at 585. Continental Oil was a takings action challenging an ordinance 
that completely prohibited drive-up gas stations within 500 feet of a school.9 There are many 
many cases in this arena and the reasoning is consistent. 




1. The City cannot be compelled to issue a second access to a lot duly created and 
approved but in contradiction with the Mountain View Subdivision Plat. 
Citing to the aforementioned cases, Arnold presents the unsupportable legal conclusion 
that her "property right appurtenant to the land abutting the public streets [is a] right of access 
[that] already exists before and after any plat is drawn."10 Arnold even has the audacity to 
paraphrase the following statement as directly attributable to the Johnston decision (specifically 
page 51 ): "there is no legal principle in the state of Idaho that would support a finding that the 
existence of a platted easement would nullify or otherwise eliminate a property owners' vested 
right to access the public roadways directly abutting their property."11 Johnston said no such 
thing. Nonetheless, Arnold concludes that that Lot 5 already has a preexisting vested right to 
access Ace of Diamonds street pursuant to Johnston. This conclusion is factually incorrect, 
deliberately obtuse, and legally unworkable. Yet, Arnold accuses the City and this Court of 
ignoring "over a century's worth of Idaho law". 12 She also attempts to recreate the wheel after 
the fact by arguing for the first time in her Motion to Correct the Record that the access to Lot 5 
had already been constructed in prior building permits and that the purpose of Building Permit 
831 was merely because the preexisting access drive merely needed "additional finish work". 
While we believe we should rely upon the established record, needless to say, the City disagrees 
with this spurious statement and the entirely of the proffered testimony of Mr. Anderson and Ms. 
Arnold. 13 
10 Objection, p. 8. 
11 Petitioner's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Rehearing, p, 5. ("Rehearing"). 
12 Rehearing, p, 6. 
13 See Affidavit of Rebecca Arnold, ,r 14. 
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All of this is also irrelevant. "Lot 5" is not some homesteader's 640 acre section of farm 
land that enjoyed access to a right of way. Rather, pursuant to the City's subdivision ordinances, 
it came into existence with the approval of the Mountain View Subdivision Plat and is subject to 
that Plat. It did not preexist anything. Lochsa Falls, LLC v. !TD, 147 Idaho 232, 207 P.3d 963 
(2009) is illustrative although even the plaintiff developer in that case did not attempt to present 
such a daft argument as here. 
In Lochsa Falls, a developer challenged ITD's requirement that the developer install an 
internal collector street with a traffic signal in order to access Chinden Boulevard. The 
developer wished to obtain the benefit of the bargain to subdivide 254 acres of farm land into 
740 residential lots and then, having received that benefit, cried foul that they had to incur the 
detriment of installing the collector street with a traffic signal. There is no mention of some 
divine vested property right appurtenant to the dozens, perhaps hundreds, of individual lot 
owners abutting Chinden Boulevard independent of and in contradiction to the plat approval. It 
was also irrelevant whether the individual lot owners called their access a driveway, private road, 
public road, drive access, or road access. 
The Lochsa Falls Court was equally unsympathetic. In particular, Justice Jim Jones 
concurring opinion was fabulous: 
... This Justice was left with the abiding feeling that Lochsa Falls benefited much 
more than the State from the Transaction at issue .... While Lochsa Falls portrays 
itself as having been put upon by being required to signalize the intersection for 
the benefit of the State and the motoring public, the reality is otherwise. The 
salient facts are that Lochsa Falls wished to develop a parcel of property located 
along a limited access highway, its traffic consultant recommended and it 
requested a signalized intersection to provide subdivision access to and from the 
- 8 -
221 
highway, it was advised it could have the signalized intersection if it would pay 
for the same, it raised no protest to this routine requirement, and having gotten the 
benefit it sought Lochsa Falls now wishes to have ITD foot the bill. 
This case could appropriately be analyzed in a contractual context Lochsa Falls 
requests that ITD grant it the right to have a signalized intersection to benefit its 
subdivision. ITD agrees, provided that Lochsa Falls pays for signalizing the 
intersection. Lochsa Falls accepts the proposal without protest and proceeds to 
perform the signalizing work. Upon completion of the work, Lochsa Falls 
unilaterally changes its mind and decides it needs to be paid for the signalizing, 
but expresses no intention of giving up the valuable benefit it has derived from the 
deal. Lochsa Falls got what it bargained for but does not wish to honor its 
undertaking to bear the cost of such benefit. Had Lochsa Falls objected to the 
requirement that it pay for signalizing the intersection, it could simply have said 
'thanks, but no thanks' and done without a signal. One suspects there is not the 
slightest chance it would have done so, as the increase in the value of its lots 
would substantially outweigh the cost of the traffic signal. . . . . Because Lochsa 
Falls has brought and appealed claims without a reasonable basis in fact or law, I 
would award ITD attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-11 7. 
Id, at 245. See also Wylie v. !TD and City of Meridian, 151 Idaho 26,253 P.3d 700 (2011). 
The bottom line is this: while a preexisting 254 acre section of farm land may have 
abutted a public road (Chinden Blvd and others) and perhaps could have a vested right to access 
an abutting road if it was otherwise rendered land-locked, this "vested right" does not extend to 
each and every lot abutting Chinden Boulevard when a developer takes advantage of Meridian's 
subdivision laws to subdivide this section ofland into 740 residential lots generating 12,480 trips 
per day. With or without "established procedures", a red herring to be discussed infra, the local 
governmental jurisdiction is not compulsorily required to extend a preexisting "vested right of 
access", if it exists at all, to each and every resulting subdivision lot that happens to abut the 
public road. There is no such vested right and Arnold fails to present a scintilla of valid legal 
argument or precedent to that effect. 
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Akin to Lochsa Falls, Arnold received the benefit of the bargain to subdivide a tract of 
land taking full advantage of Stanley's subdivision ordinances. The resultant final plat of the 
Mountain View Subdivision, prepared and presented by Arnold, clearly depicts that Lot 5 was 
granted direct access from Highway 21 on its north-west side via an access road depicted along 
the western edge of Lot 6. 14 As she points out, this was her request. Arnold clearly stated in 
Permit 690R-2: 
No structure; excavation, grading and fill material, construction of Mountain 
View Subdivision Utilities (underground); silt fencing and/or retaining walls ... ; 
construction of access roads,· utilities, etc. to be installed per preliminary plat 
approval for Mountain View Subdivision. 
Emphasis added. Arnold now wishes to recreate the wheel as to what was and was not 
specifically approved in her subdivision application. This is not the venue or medium to 
challenge her subdivision plat entitlements. Certainly, were the City to deny Lot 5 access to 
Highway 21, there is not the slightest chance that Arnold would not be the first one to enforce 
the entitlements afforded to her pursuant to her plat approval. The approved Mountain View 
Subdivision Plat and prior approved building permits do not depict that an access road on the 
eastern edge of Lot 5 will connect to Ace of Diamonds street along a steep ravine. Arnold 
believes it a strength of her argument that the City did not apply the hillside ordinances to her 
application. In reality, this strengthens the City's interpretation because no one considered 
accessing this subdivision down a steep ravine. How steep is the ravine? We suspect that we 
14 AR. P. 65. 
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now actually know the answer to this question, but again, the time and place for this is in her 
application; not in judicial review after the fact limited to administrative record. 
More importantly, a city is not required to grant Arnold a secondary access to the City's 
right of way or "road" (i.e. "road access"?) by virtue of some surviving divine vested right 
afforded not only to the original tract of land but to each and every subsequent subdivision lot 
that happens to abut a public street where said access is not depicted in a properly approved, and 
bargained for, subdivision plat. 
In Arnold's Rehearing request (Argument A.I, p. 5), Arnold misconstrues and misquotes 
the City and this Court in stating that the plat "only allows for one access point to Lot 5". While 
this is true, the legal significance of an approved access pursuant to the Mountain View 
Subdivision is not that Arnold is legally precluded from having two accesses or that she is legally 
precluded from adding or even substituting a second access in contravention of an approved 
preliminary plat. Rather the legal significance of the Mountain View Subdivision plat is that 
Arnold is not entitled to a second access as a vested right. In short, Arnold is not land-locked nor 
has she in any way asserted that her approved access pursuant to her preliminary plat is 
unworkable. She has not requested a plat-amendment. The City is not compelled to grant a 
secondary access to a lot in an approved subdivision by virtue that the subdivided lot is adjacent 
to a city street. 
B. Arnold's contention that the City is without any legal authority or municipal 
ordinances that require a building permit to build an access with accompanying 
technical information lacks a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
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Whether via a plat amendment or building permit, the City is not compelled to grant 
Arnold a secondary access to a lot within an approved subdivision as a matter of right 
irrespective of "established procedures". However, even if Arnold's application contained 
anything substantive beyond "gravel" enabling the City to consider granting the request, Arnold 
contends in her Objection that the City possesses no legal authority or codified municipal 
standards to either 1) require a building permit to construct an access road; and/or 2) require 
technical plans and specifications in conjunction with an application for a building permit to 
construct an access. 15 She in essence argues that the City must simply accept whatever Arnold 
wishes to utilize to construct her road whether it be dirt, gravel, or silly putty. Safety is 
presumably irrelevant and any inquiry by the City "[r]egardless whether the Court [also] deems 
the City's [public safety] concerns reasonable" is legally precluded because the "City Council 
has not codified or otherwise established these alleged standards." 16 In short, Arnold claims 
there are no "established procedures" so she can do absolutely anything with impunity. 
Respectfully, we do not agree. 
I. Public Health and Safety Consideration 
Pursuant to Title 50, Chapter 13 a municipality's police power extends to the regulation 
of subdivisions and any streets, driveways, alleys, or accesses whether private or public. 1718 
15 See also Request, p. 4. 
16 Objection, p. 9. 
17 See Title 50, Chapter 13. We need not discuss the jurisdictional distinctions between ITD or highways districts 
which also possess such power for their respective public road ways. 
18 As a matter of law, the power to "regulate" streets is conferred on the municipality and the City has every right to 
regulate work performed on its own right-of-way. McQuillen, §30.40." "In Idaho the streets from side to side and 
end to end belong to the public and are held by the municipality in trust for the use of the public." In/anger v. City 
a/Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 49, 44 P.3d 1100, 1104 (2002); Kleiber v. City of Idaho Falls, 110 Idaho 501,503,716 
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"Government power over public ways is 'exclusive and unlimited' ."19 Further, the City further 
possesses implied police powers to protect the public health and safety. As to these "unknown 
ordinances", Arnold conveniently ignores Stanley Municipal Code (hereinafter "SMC") 15.04 
which governs the process for the issuance of a building permit. SMC 15.04.010 provides that 
No ... lot [shall] be excavated for sidewalks, ... roads, or any other purpose, nor 
shall fill be placed on any lot, nor shall any lot be cleared, or fenced unless a 
building permit therefor has been issued . . . Permittee shall follow good 
engineering practices relating to fill compaction for structural support and for 
preventing collapse and/or erosion of fill not used for structural support. 
Emphasis added. SMC 15.04.020 additionally requires that 
Applications . . . shall be accompanied [with] . . . a drawing showing the location 
of the proposed project on the applicant's property and the location of the 
property in the city, building plans and specifications, and proof of approval of 
the proposed project by the appropriate fire department and the appropriate sewer 
district or state health department. Applications which do not contain all of the 
foregoing shall not be considered complete. Development and construction 
drawings and technical support material shall be to scale or otherwise in sufficient 
detail to allow a technical or engineering review to determine whether the 
proposed development complies with all zoning requirements. 
Emphasis added. 
Arnold wishes to build a road access which admittedly includes modifying the City's 
right of way placing great amounts of fill on a steep slope for an access to her commercial lot. 
There can be absolutely no question that such work required Arnold to obtain a building permit. 
P.2d 1273, 1275 (1986) citing Keyser v. City of Boise, 30 Idaho 440, 165 P. 1121 (1917). A city has exclusive 
control by virtue of its police power over its streets, highways and sidewalks within the municipal boundaries. Id; 
See also Tyrolean Associates v. City of Ketchum, 100 Idaho 703, 604 P.2d 717 (1979); City a/Nampa v. Swayne, 97 
Idaho 530, 547 P.2d 1135 (1976); Yellow Cab Taxi Service v. City of Twin Falls, 68 Idaho 145, 190 P.2d 681 
(1948). 
19 Merritt v. State, 742 P.2d 397, 113 Idaho 142 (1986) quoting Cf Foster's Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201,211, 
118 P.2d 721, 725 (1941). 
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She failed to do so. Moreover, after completing said work, what technical information 
("development and construction drawings and technical support") has she provided that would 
lead a responsible decision maker to conduct an engineering review such to render a finding that 
she has demonstrated "good engineering practices" thereby protecting the public health and 
safety? 
In her application she merely provided that Ace of Diamonds Street was to be "graveled" 
and that "gravel to be placed as needed to provide access to/from the property to/from Ace of 
Diamonds by all types of vehicles". There is a complete absence of technical drawings. There is 
a complete absence of any explanation of the engineering employed. Arnold reasons that 
because the City did not overtly define "good engineering practices" or specify by ordinance 
what must be included in the development and construction drawings, the City possesses no legal 
authority whatsoever to reject a proposal and Arnold has carte blanche right do whatever she 
wishes. Specifically, Arnold objects to the City's examples of what good engineering practices 
might entail including slope percentage, hillside stabilization, drainage, fill material and 
proposed compaction, and other public works road standards that would enable a city council 
(and its engineer) to easily conduct an engineering review to approve an application as in 
compliance with the Stanley Municipal Code and the Mountain View Plat. 
These are but examples of what she could do. We are not the engineer. The onus is on 
the applicant to demonstrate good engineering practices best accomplished by a competent 
contractor and/or an engineer; not the City. It is not the City's job to stand in the shoes of an 
engineer/applicant to produce development and construction drawings and technical support 
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material. It is the City's job after such information is provided to conduct its own engineering 
review of the applicant's plans to verify that good engineering practices have been followed so 
that this drive access does not collapse or erode and suffer other concerns related to the public 
health and safety. 
Arnold describes this as "unfettered discretion", but she completely misses the point. 
More importantly, such an accusation is not ripe as the City has not exercised unfettered 
discretion or any discretion at all. There was nothing to arbitrarily reject. Arnold produced 
nothing. Put simply, Arnold lacks standing and there is no justiciable case or controversy. In 
Arnold v. City of Stanley, Arnold did the very same thing. All the way to the Idaho Supreme 
Court, she challenged the City's starting a public hearing five minutes earlier than advertised; a 
meeting that she did not attend nor ever intended on attending. The Idaho Supreme Court held 
that she did not have standing because she did not even claim to have been harmed by the 
meeting's early starting time. 
Because a plain reading of the statute contradicts the Arnolds' position, and 
because they do not even claim to have been actually harmed by the 6:00 p.m. 
meeting's early start time, we find that their appeal was brought without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. 20 · 
The same is true here, but worse because this pertains to the public health and safety. Perhaps 
had Arnold (or her engineer) in good faith made some prima facie presentation of what she or her 
engineer believed to be detailed engineering plans demonstrating good engineering practices and 
the City arbitrarily rejected her plans without conducting its own engineering review or did so 
20 Arnoldv. City of Stanley, 345 P.3d 1008, 1014, 158 Idaho 218,226 (2015) 
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unreasonably, a court might consider whether the City had arbitrarily rejected her expert's 
proposal. This issue is not ripe because Arnold did not do anything at all; just demanded the 
City has no power whatsoever. 
Arnold also conveniently ignores the plethora of SMC subdivision ordinance provisions 
pertaining to slopes21 that Arnold does not believe apply to an access road in the building permit 
process. This is an access road in an approved subdivision. What argument could there possibly 
be that soil and roadway standards, especially pertaining to fill utilized to stabilize slopes, 
contained within the subdivision ordinances do not apply to a proposed access along a steep 
slope to a lot in an approved subdivision? Her reasoning is circular; that her access drive was or 
should have been considered and approved in her subdivision application, but then claims that 
none of the subdivision standards that would have applied to such a steep slope, if indeed this 
access was a consideration, should apply to a building permit in a subdivision lot in an approved 
subdivision plat. 
As a matter of public health and safety, the City denied the building permit due to the 
absence of any technical information that would allow the City to render a finding that the 
applicant utilized good engineering practices. It is undisputed that Arnold failed to provide any 
specifications or technical information or articulate any engineering standards at all. John 
Anderson does not speak for the City and it is unclear what purpose she believes an affidavit 
should serve that was proffered not in the administrative process but after the Court's Order. 
21 See SMC 16.08.190, SMC 16.36.060, 17.40.32.D governing slope standards and building on a slope. 
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Arnold is not eligible for a building permit. While Arnold believes it is sufficient to 
merely state that "gravel" will be used, the City acting within its police powers finds this 
unacceptable. Due to the severity of the slope, the City in its police power has every right to 
regulate the construction of access roads ( or whatever Arnold wants to call it today) within its 
jurisdiction especially as it applies to the modification of its own right-of-way to be discussed 
infra. Arnold's contention that in the absence of specific public works road standards a City is 
legally precluded from denying any request at all lacks a reasonable basis in fact and law. The 
City's ordinances are adequate to put the incentive on the applicant to demonstrate that it has 
demonstrated good engineering practices thereby protecting the public health and safety. The 
City is not compulsorily required to accept her demand to build an access road absent a permit 
without a scintilla of information provided in support thereof in contradiction to her own plat. 
C. Additional arguments presented in the Rehearing request.22 
1. Arnold's contention that a plat is not required to identify connectivity to public 
rights of way is irrelevant but nonetheless incorrect. 
Arnold argues that a "subdivision plat is not required to contain any and all points of 
access to the public roads" and more specifically that a plat does not need to show how inner 
connector streets or individual lots will access the public roadways. This is irrelevant. First, if 
Arnold thinks the Idaho Code enables her to surreptitiously connect each and every lot in her plat 
to connect to an abutting street as a matter of right; this is legally unsupportable. Second, even if 
22 Argument A. 1-3 are addressed supra. Argument B. I and 2 will be addressed herein. 
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it is not required (which we disagree) the fact remains that she did not clearly depict an access to 
Ace of Diamonds although she did clearly depict an access to Highway 21. Regardless, while 
she can of course seek to amend her plat, Arnold's time period to clarify or object to her 
approved Mountain View Subdivision plat has long since passed and Arnold presents no 
justiciable case or controversy in this cause of action. Her allegations have no reasonable basis 
in fact or law and are in fact logically incongruous to subdivision law. 
As a matter of law a subdivision plat must depict all roads, alleys, easements, and 
accesses within the subdivision. Additionally, the boundaries of each lot as well as the exterior 
boundaries of the subdivision must be shown.23 Arnold is being deliberately obtuse employing 
chicanery to argue that one can realistically depict the external boundaries of each lot and the 
subdivision in general as well as all easements, roads, alleys, and accesses without depicting it in 
relationship to the neighboring properties and adjacent or abutting right-of-ways. A plat 
application does not satisfy Title 50, Chapter 13 if the plat does not depict where and how the 
roads, streets, access, alleys, and easements begin and terminate; i.e. a solid line dead-end, curb, 
berm, fence, etc. or an open line stub street or connectivity to adjoining parcels or public roads. 
While irrelevant, Arnold is being disingenuous to argue that a developer, while required to depict 
how particular lots will access an inner private road easement within the subdivision, nonetheless 
possesses an independent divine vested right that secretly allows her to also utilize a secondary 
external access to the city's right of way up a steep slope24 along the external boundaries of the 
subdivision without depicting such plans on the plat. This is academic as her plat does depict 
23 See Idaho Code§§ 50-1304; 1313, 1330. 
24 along with concomitant required slope contour lines ... see SMC 16.16.030 K. "Contour lines" 
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Lot S's access to Highway 21, but does not depict access to Ace of Diamonds not to mention the 
absence of any technical data of how this access is to be constructed. 
2. Arnolds contention that the access drive is not constructed on the City property is 
erroneous. 
On page 8-9 of Arnold's Rehearing request under the caption "[t]he access drive is not 
constructed on City property", Arnold criticizes this Court's "factually flawed" finding that the 
City's "requests seem reasonable due to the special circumstances regarding the slope of the 
access road and the fact that the road is being constructed on city property." Id First, she argues 
that the road is not constructed on city property; that it is "fully contained within ... Lot 5". This 
is absurd. Second, she presents the strange argument that since the access was already built, it 
cannot be built on the City's property. We have no idea what this means since the City's right of 
way has been altered by Arnold. Third, which seems to restate the first, is her claim that 
"Building Permit No. 831 sought no construction on the City's property." 
Arnold argues that this "Court's conclusion is based upon an erroneous understanding 
that the Arnolds were somehow seeking to construct an access road on top of City property" 
which she argues is "belied by the record". Id, at 9. As to all of Arnold's cantankerous 
accusations that the City and/or the Court has "grossly mischaracterized" the record, the record 
speaks for itself. Take for example, Arnold's very own letter dated March 31, 2014 regarding 
Building Permit 831 (AR 42): 
"This building permit is no different than a previous permit #637 ... , which 




Ace of Diamonds. .. .. [T]he Site Plan attached to 637 clearly showed the work 
to be done on both the Arnold Property and the referenced city streets. . .. 
There was no separate permit required for the work done on the City streets and 
the Stanley Municipal Code (SMC) does not have a permitting process for 
construction access onto city streets. 
Id Emphasis Added. While we disagree with everything she said, the frivolity of her position is 
palpable. 
With regard to her defense that Arnold did not construct an access road on city property 
because "the access driveway already exists", 25 she castigates the City Attorney for his audacity 
to state that she did so illegally. She plays the "prejudiced" victim "stemming from certain 
untruths conveyed to the Court by the City"26 that the Arnold's constructed a road in violation of 
applicable city ordinances. She claims a new hearing is required because the City Attorney 
"lobbed accusations of criminal and otherwise illegal conduct by the Arnolds" and "that there is 
nothing in the record to support the City's unsubstantiated and plainly false accusations" fearing 
that this Court couldn't read the record for itself and instead relied on the City Attorney's "realm 
of untruth". 27 As the Court is familiar with the record, this is no need to reply other than to note 
the absurdity of the accusation and the extent of the harassment in the Petition for Rehearing. 
SMC 15.04.010 provides that 
No .. . lot [ shall] be excavated for sidewalks, ... roads, or any other purpose, nor 
shall fill be placed on any lot, nor shall any lot be cleared, or fenced unless a 
building permit therefor has been issued 
25 Rehearing, p. 9. 
26 Rehearing, p. 2. 
27 Rehearing, p. 3. 
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Emphasis added. SMC 15.04.050 "Enforcement" provides a misdemeanor penalty for a 
violation of the provisions of the chapter. Arnold constructed an access utilizing great amounts 
of fill without a building permit. In addition to civil remedies, the City has probably cause to 
"lob an accusation" that Arnold is in violation of the law both civilly and criminally. 
Incredulously, she now seems to suggest that the work was de minimus and did not 
require a building permit. 
Building Permit No. 831 sought no construction on the City's property. Rather, it 
sought to smooth the transition between the existing public roadway and the 
existing access driveway by simply laying additional gravel at the transition 
between the dirt/gravel Ace of Diamonds roadway and the dirt/gravel driveway 
for Lot 5.28 
So she admittedly wished to "smooth the transition" with gravel which she claims in just "finish 
work". This is so patently false and more importantly not supported in the record. She dumped 
countless amounts of fill just to raise the level up this steep slope to meet Ace of Diamonds. She 
clearly modified her lot and the City's right of way as is plainly evident in the agency record. 
3. Access Road versus Driveway 
On pages 2 and 3 of its Rehearing request, Arnold condemns, defames, and insults the City and 
the City Attorney for articulating the aforementioned access as a "road access" or "roadway", which she 
now articulates is a "driveway access". Arnold describes the City's reference of a "roadway" or "road 
access" as a "gross mischaracterization", "barren assertions during oral argument", "untruths", 
"misinformation", and other such mundane characterizations. First, this is completely irrelevant if not 
completely unprofessional and offensive. It matters not what she calls it. She is attempting to access a 
28 Rehearing, p. 9. 
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pubic road. A mere lot in a duly approved subdivision does not have a vested right to access a city right 
of way in contravention of the plat whether on Ace of Diamonds street or Chinden Boulevard. 
Second, in none of the agency records can we locate where she describes this access as a 
"driveway". In none of the briefing can the City locate where we referred to the access as a "roadway". 
The City refers to this as an "access road" as it is an access to the City's Right of Way; i.e .... an access 
to a road. Ironically Arnold does too. It is only in a footnote that Arnold concedes this point that she too 
described this as an "access road". So she condemns the City attorney for "barren assertions" and 
"gross mischaracterizations" but she calls it the same thing. The City has since looked through the 
record and Arnold consistently referred to her accesses as an "access road" not a "driveway"; i.e. in 
Arnold's letters to the City (AR 92 "While we do not agree that individual lot permits are required for 
installation of utility lines and roads for the subdivision ... "), in her building permit applications AR 69, 
AR 77, 80, 83 ("construction of access roads") AR 93, 94 ("installation of utilities and roads in 
easement") , and on the face of the Mountain View Subdivision plat itself, Arnold does not ever call her 
access a "driveway". Id. Emphasis Added. 
The only other distinction Arnold makes is to call the access an "easement" and purportedly 
therefore not a road. What she obviously does not realize is that it is typical that public streets and 
private streets are actually just easements. It is a misconception to think that even a dedicated street is 
held in fee simple. It is merely an easement held on behalf of the public so her emphasis that her access 
road is an easement and therefore dispositive is irrelevant. Whether called an access road, road 
easement, or access drive is inconsequential. What is consequential is that Arnold seeks to connect 
whatever this thing is to the City's right of way and as provided herein, a mere subdivision lot does not 
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possess a vested right to connect to an adjacent city right of way and certainly not without demonstrating 
that it will be performed safely. 
D. Arnold lacks a reasonable basis in fact and law because she still has failed to demonstrate 
that the City prejudiced her substantial rights or that she has suffered any harm. 
The party contesting a city council's decision must demonstrate that 1) the board erred in 
a manner specified in Idaho Code section 67-5279(3); and 2) that the board's action prejudiced 
its substantial rights. 29 Absent either of these two conditions, the district court must affirm the 
board's action30. "There is a strong presumption that the actions of the [local governmental 
entity], where it has interpreted and applied its own ... ordinances, are valid."31 
As stated herein, the approved plat for the Mountain View Subdivision granted Lot 5 
direct access from Highway 21 on its north-west side via an access road depicted along the 
western edge of Lot 6. 32 Although she clearly would like two accesses and subjectively believes 
she has this right, she has not plead any actualized harm by not being granted two accesses to her 
property. Her claim of right is illusory and her purported injury is self-induced. Arnold 
provided no evidence how this access; i.e. complying with her own plat, constituted a hardship or 
is otherwise unworkable nor has she sought to amend her plat. Now, Arnold's application seeks 
a secondary access from Ace of Diamonds Street, which is not depicted on the approved 
Mountain View Plat and more importantly her application is bereft of any technical information 
29 I.C. § 67-5279(4); Neighbors/or a Healthy Gold Fork, 145 Idaho at 126, 176 P.3d at 131. 
30 Taylor, 147 Idaho at 431,210 P.3d at 539. 
31 Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 74, 73 P.3d 84, 87 (2003) 
32 AR. P. 65. 
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to ensure the protection of the public health and safety. Her building permit application was 
denied and she is in the same position as she was upon the approval of her subdivision. She still 
has an approved access to her lot. 
E. Respondents should be awarded their reasonable attorney fees and costs and this Court 
may wish to consider Rule 11 Sanctions. 
Arnold has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
117, and has in fact presented facts and law that are irrelevant nor good faith reasonably to be 
expected to extend clear modern subdivision law. I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(l). Nothing has changed and 
the arguments remain the same although her harassment is palpable in accusing both the City and 
the Court of ignoring a century of established precedent. Again, this Court is hard-pressed to 
find a single alleged fact or legal argument that makes any sense at all. 
Arnold cannot compulsorily require the city to issue a building permit to construct an 
access by virtue that one of the many lots in an approved subdivision abuts a city street where 
she clearly has access to her lot already. Johnston and its progeny do not stand for such a 
conclusion and she negates to cite to the myriad of decisions that contradict her conclusions. 
While we may disagree as to what is or is not required in a plat, this issue is not properly before 
this Court. She never objected and her time to object to what is and is not contemplated in her 
plat has long since passed absent a re-plat. She has not amended her plat nor indicated that her 
approved access is unsatisfactory. More importantly, she was granted the only access that she 
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specifically asked for in her plat. Her assertion that she possesses other secret vested rights to 
access adjacent streets is legally indefensible. 
The City does not act arbitrarily by enforcing ordinances that do in fact exist along with 
Idaho statutes that collectively require an applicant to demonstrate good engineering practices 
and produce enough information to allow the decision maker to responsibly render a finding that 
the materials utilized will be installed (including on the City's right of way) in a professional 
manner especially in light of the safety issues attributable to the steepness of the slope. While 
Arnold objects to the City's examples of what could be construed as good engineering principles, 
the simple fact is that the onus is on the applicant to demonstrate something, i.e. good 
engineering principles with technical plans and specifications; not the City. Perhaps if she had 
and the City arbitrarily denied her expert's good faith prima facie offering of sound engineering, 
she might have a basis to object. She offered nothing. 
The Petition for Rehearing and Motion to Correct the Record are offered for an improper 
purpose. It is needlessly increasing the costs of litigation, and we cannot but offended by its 
harassing nature. We seriously doubt that the City and the Court has ignored a century of 
binding legal precedent. We also doubt that the City's recitation of the record at oral argument 
was in any way incorrect, but more importantly, somehow supplants this Court's own 
independent review of the record. Arnold closes her Rehearing request by stating that asking this 
Court to reconsider its decision "necessarily places them in the undesirable position of 
suggesting to this Court that it committed legal error in reaching its Decision." I doubt the Court 
would ever object to a litigant pointing out a legal error or correcting an incorrect factual record, 
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but Arnold is doing no such thing. If there is something undesirable in Arnold's strategy, Arnold 
puts herself in this position by attacking the City, misrepresenting applicable precedent, 
misrepresenting the record, and accusing the Court of being incapable of performing an 
independent review of the record; all after stubbornly installing an access road without a permit, 
without any technical information, and seemingly without a scintilla of consideration for the 
people who will be walking and driving on this access. 
Unfortunately, the City is accustomed to bearing such attacks by Arnold. In Arnold v. 
City of Stanley, 345 P.3d 1008, 158 Idaho 218 (2015), the Idaho Supreme Court was 
unpersuaded by her arguments that she had a reasonable basis in fact or law even in matters of 
first impression. 
Although this Court typically does not award attorney fees in matters of first 
impression, " [ t]he purpose of I. C. § 12-117 is to serve as a deterrent to groundless 
or arbitrary action and to provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and 
unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless charges." In Castrigno 
v. McQuade, this Court awarded attorney fees to Ada County when an appellant 
appealed without a reasonable basis in fact or law. There we reasoned, in part, 
that attorney fees were appropriate because the appellants, in arguing to the Court, 
had added nothing to the argument that failed in the district court. Id. We noted 
that appellants had the benefit of the district court's well-reasoned, articulate 
analysis finding against their position, yet they still chose to expend more time 
and resources to bring an appeal, using the same arguments that were 
unpersuasive below and remained unpersuasive on appeal. Id. Here, although the 
Court has not before addressed the scope of who may bring an enforcement action 
under Section 67-2347(6), the plain language of that section is clear enough that 
we believe the Arnolds' appeal was made without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law. Asserting that an appeal involves a matter of first impression is not a "free 
pass" to bring an appeal based on unreasonable arguments ..... Although the 
Arnolds had the benefit of the district court's articulate and well-reasoned analysis 
to that effect, they still chose to bring an appeal, further raising the expense to the 
City to defend against the same arguments. Because a plain reading of the statute 
contradicts the Arnolds' position, and because they do not even claim to have 
- 26 -
239 
been actually harmed by the 6:00 p.m. meeting's early start time, we find that their 
appeal was brought without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
Arnold v. City of Stanley, 345 P.3d 1008, 1014, 158 Idaho 218, 226 (Idaho 2015) Emphasis 
added. The City has borne an unfair and unjustified financial burden against groundless charges. 
The City was forced to litigate this and the resulting decision rendered by this Court was well 
reasoned and articulate. All of the myriad of filings submitted after this Court's Order simply 




The City requests that this Court deny the request to rehear this action and pursuant to 
Idaho Code 12-117 award the City its reasonable costs and attorney fees and costs incurred in 
this matter further allowing the City to amend its Memorandum of Costs to include the time and 
expense necessary to prepare for this hearing including attendance therein on September 16, 
2015. 
Dated this 12th day of October, 2015. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER 
THOMAS ARNOLD AND REBECCA 
ARNOLD, HUSBAND AND WIFE, 
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CITY OF STANLEY, A POLITICAL 
SUDIVISION OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No.: CV 2014-35 
PETITIONERS' REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
COME NOW Petitioners Thomas Arnold and Rebecca Arnold ("Arnolds"), by and 
through their counsel of record the firm of GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A., and 
hereby submit this reply memorandum in support of their Petition for Rehearing. 
INTRODUCTION 
The contentious relationship between the City of Stanley ("City") and the Arnolds is 
apparent in the briefing before this Court. However, that contentiousness warrants neither the 
amount of hyperbole used by the City nor its request for Rule 11 sanctions against the Arnolds. 
Cutting through the extraneous matter and without burdening the Com1 with an in-kind response 
to what the Arnolds consider to be a mischaracterization of both their tone and their approach on 
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this Petition, the fact remains that the City has failed to justify its contentions and positions in 
this case with any applicable law. Rather, the City has continuously 1) made barren assertions of 
law that are devoid of legal citation or support, 2) misconstrued the facts of the case in a manner 
not supported by the record before the Court, and 3) misapplied existing and applicable law. 
Because the Arnolds are prepared to stand on the arguments previously set forth in their 
Memorandum in Support of Petition for Rehearing, filed on July 15, 2015, they will not 
endeavor to readdress each argument set forth therein. However, the record before the Court 
demonstrates that the City of Stanley did not premise its denial of Building Permit No. 831 upon 
a finding that the Arnolds did not have an access right to their property where it abuts Ace of 
Diamonds Street, but the Court relied heavily upon such a conclusion in upholding the denial of 
that Building Permit. Because that conclusion was legal error, the Arnolds respectfully request a 
rehearing of this matter to review the Court's prior decision in a light not clouded by such error 
of law and fact regarding the Arnold's property within the City of Stanley. 
ARGUMENT 
Through all of the briefing and argument presented to the Court regarding the Arnolds' 
access rights to their property, there remains one crucial and unremedied deficiency in the City's 
arguments: The City has never exercised the police power with which it now wishes to shield its 
actions. Because a governmental entity must validly and appropriately exercise its police powers 
by duly passing rules and regulations before it can impose such rules and regulations, and 
because the City of Stanley has not done so, the Court has committed legal error in its Decision 
and Order Re: Judicial Review of Building Permit Denial ("Decision") in finding that the 
Arnolds have improperly implemented an access point on their property and that the City is 
justified in denying that access point. In view of this error, as weU as the others identified in the 
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Arnolds' filings in this matter, the Arnolds respectfully request a rehearing on the merits of this 
case, in which each of the issues originally presented for judicial review be reconsidered in 
accordance with the duly-enacted laws and regulations ( or lack thereof) applicable to the 
arbitrary denial of the Arnolds' building permit. 
1. The City has Not Presented any Authority Supporting its Ad Hoc Utilization of its 
Police Powers to Restrict Access to Private Property Absent Prior Action to Adopt 
Rules and Regulations Governing Access. 
In the midst of accusing the Arnolds of "[a]rguably running afoul of I.R.C.P. I l(a)(l)," 
the City has asse1ted to this Court that the Arnolds have "conveniently left out the very next 
paragraph [of the Johnston1 decision] which provided that 'the right of access, however, may be 
regulated, for it is subservient to the primary rights of the public to the free use of the streets for 
travel and incidental purposes. "'2 However, the City has itself failed to provide a complete 
analysis of what Johnston requires in order for the City to regulate access. Thus, the issue now 
before the Court is not whether the City can regulate access; it is whether the City actually has 
regulated access prior to this case. As such, the City's claim that the Arnolds "twist[]" the legal 
principles of the Johnston decision is inaccurate, as Johnston (and a wealth of other case law in 
Idaho) unequivocally holds that a private property owner maintains a vested and unregulated 
right of access from his property to the abutting public streets until and unless the governing 
body responsible for those streets takes action to regulate. 
In criticizing the Arnolds' reliance on Johnston, the City contends that the Arnolds' 
conclusion (that they maintain a vested right of access to the abutting public streets) is "factually 
incorrect, deliberately obtuse, and legally unworkable."3 However, the City then fails to provide 
1 Johnston v. Boise City, 87 Idaho 44, 51,390 P.2d 291,294 (1964). 
2 City's Response to Petitioner's [sic] Objection to Respondent's Memorandum of Attorney Fee's [sic} 
and Costs and Petition/or Rehearing("Response"), p. 4. 
3 Response, p. 7. 
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the Court with a single legal citation that supports its position. Indeed, two of the three legal 
citations relied upon by the City, as explored in greater detail below, were cases involving the 
Idaho Transportation Department - likely the public entity in Idaho that has implemented the 
most regulation regarding usage of streets and a far cry from a reasonable comparison to the City 
of Stanley given its complete lack of such regulation in the Stanley Municipal Code. At its core, 
the question presented for this Court in this Petition for Rehearing is: Can a municipality that has 
not regulated rights of access within its jurisdiction using its police powers nevertheless 
arbitrarily impose restrictions upon one landowner, which restrictions have not ever before been 
imposed, without utilizing the regular and required channels for passing such regulations under 
their police powers? The answer to this question is no, yet that is exactly what the City has 
argued for and what it has been granted through this Court's prior decision. Despite the 
uncontroverted power of the City to regulate access to and from its streets, the fact is that the 
City has never before (and to this day has not) exercised that power. The City conflates the 
Arnolds argument (that although the City has the power to so regulate access, it has not done so), 
with an argument not once offered by the Arnolds: "The City is ... powerless" to regulate 
access.4 This is a straw man argument, a logical fallacy. 
Thus, the fundamental issue presented by the Arnolds in seeking this Court's 
reconsideration of its prior decision arises from the Court's conclusion, at the urging of the City, 
that a property owner does not have an inherent right of access to the abutting public roadways. 
The Johnston decision settles this question - while a "right of access ... may be regulated," in 
the absence of such regulation a landowner's right of access to an abutting public street is "one 
of the incidents of ownership" and remains "appurtenant to the land and is a vested right." 87 
Idaho at 51 ( emphasis added). This established Idaho law is incompatible with the Court's 
4 Response, p. 2 (emphasis added). 
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statement that it "is hard pressed to believe· that just because a parcel abuts a city street that 
parcel would be entitled to access to that street."5 The City has neither presented evidence of 
such a regulation within the Stanley Municipal Code, nor has it presented any case law 
controverting Johnston.6 
Rather, the City's own citations iIIustrate the Arnolds' argument.7 !TD v. HI Boise, LLC, 
153 Idaho 334 (2012), for example, involved a claim for severance damages for limitation of an 
access road in the context of a properly-executed exercise of eminent domain. 153 Idaho at 341. 
The Idaho Supreme Court found that "no severance occurs where the court finds as a matter of 
law that an access right has merely been regulated by an exercise of police power rather than 
taken by eminent domain." Id. (emphasis added). The key in HJ Boise that the City is 
disregarding, then, is that the Idaho Transportation Department had taken proper legal action in 
accordance with the laws of the state of Idaho when it "condemned a narrow strip along the west 
edge of the HI Boise property, on which it constructed a new bike lane and sidewalk." This 
action was consistent with ITD's exercise of its police power. In contrast, the City of Stanley has 
never taken any action (through eminent domain or regulation) to restrict property owners' rights 
of access to the city streets. 
Similarly, in Lochsa Falls, LLC v. !TD, 147 Idaho 232 (2009), the Supreme Court 
decided an issue that arose out of an actual exercise of ITD's police powers: "Pursuant to its 
grant of authority under LC.§§ 40-310(9), 40-311(1), 40-312(3), 40-313(2), and 49-202(19), 
(23) and (28), 49-221, and 67-5203, the Board of ITD promulgated the 'Rules Governing 
Highway Right-of-Way Encroachments on State Rights-of-Way."' 147 Idaho at 238. Among the 
5 D . . 5 ec1smn, p .. 
6 The City accurately points out that this case is not a takings case. This emphasizes the point - up until the briefing 
before this Court on the Arnolds' Petition for Judicial Review, the City had not taken any action or made any 
argument whatsoever that the Arnolds somehow no longer had a right of access. The City has not regulated access. 
7 Response, p. 4, n. 8. 
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Rules promulgated, ITD "require[ d] that any new encroachment to a· controlled state highway 
must comply with the safety specification and standards specified by ITD and that an application 
may be denied if it does not." Id. (citing IDAPA 39.03.42.300.06; 39.03.42.300.09). There is 
nothing similar in the Stanley Municipal Code or any other rules or regulations passed by the 
City, yet the City has claimed a right to nevertheless arbitrarily impose such standards when it 
pleases. Again, the Arnolds do not quarrel with the existence of the City's power to make such 
rules, but in the absence of such action by the City, the Arnolds do quarrel with the City's sudden 
imposition of unwritten rules that, for the first time in the history of the City of Stanley, restrict 
property owners' rights of access to and from their property. 
Finally, the City's citation to Killinger v. Twin Falls Highway District, 135 Idaho 322 
(2000), counsels in favor of the same result. In Killinger, the Idaho Supreme Court again upheld 
the long-standing rule of law in Idaho that "the right of a property owner to access a public way 
is a vested property right appurtenant to the land abutting the public way in question, and that an 
unreasonable limitation upon such a right may constitute a taking requiring compensation." 135 
Idaho at 325. Further, the Supreme Court determined exactly that which is claimed by the 
Arnolds here, to wit, a failure of a governmental entity to utilize the proper procedures available 
for the exercise of its police powers is improper. 8 "When the state appropriates property without 
going through the procedure of a condemnation, the property owner may initiate an inverse 
condemnation suit and request compensation." Id. (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
The City of Stanley is not above the law, and cannot simply impose ad hoc restrictions 
upon a landowner without going through the normal channels of passing regulations that can be 
readily accessed and reviewed by a landowner to ensure his/her compliance with those 
8 While Killinger was an inverse condemnation case seeking damages for an unlawful taking, the 
principle that the government must actually exercise its police powers in order to rely on its police powers 
remains the same. 
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regulations. More to the point in this litigation, the City cannot simply do whatever its current 
leadership feels like - governed by the excruciatingly apparent animosity that is prevalent 
throughout the City's briefing - and then simply hoist the flag of "police powers" to justify its 
failure or refusal to heed its own laws. 
2. The Mountain View Subdivision Plat does Not Govern Access. 
In addition to the legal error regarding rights of access in the state of Idaho when the 
governing body has not appropriately and properly passed regulations limiting access to city 
streets (as the City has not), the Arnolds' respectfully contend that the subdivision plat for the 
Mountain View Subdivision should not be regarded as a basis to limit or otherwise restrict their 
access rights. Again, the question before the Court has been misconstrued by the City. Rather 
than whether the City must be "required to grant Arnold a secondary access,"9 the pertinent 
question is whether, absent any regulation in this regard, the City has any right to arbitrarily tell 
its residents where they can and cannot take ingress and egress from their property. Because the 
City has not regulated access to the public streets within its city limits, this is not, as the City has 
attempted to argue, a question of whether the City must "grant" a landowner one, two, four, or 
nineteen access points. Such an inquiry is only appropriate in evaluating damages in a takings 
case - it is not relevant to the question at hand. 10 Rather, until regulation has been properly 
adopted by the City, a landowner has the right to access the public streets wherever his property 
so abuts and without any preliminary "grant" by the City. 11 
Thus, the inquiry turns to whether the Mountain View Subdivision plat should be 
9 Response, p. l l ( emphasis in original). 
10 Johnston, 87 Idaho at 52-53. 
11 As the Idaho Supreme Court noted in Johnston: "[W]here the abutting owner had other means of access, the right 
of access mav be denied by a police regulation." 87 Idaho at 53. Put another way, where an abutting owner has other 
means of access, that access exists without restriction until and unless such access is actually denied by a proper use 
of police regulation. 
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considered, for purposes of this action, to be the requisite exercise of police power regarding the 
Arnolds' access rights to their property. On this point, the Arnolds have previously set forth the 
required components for plats under Idaho law, Idaho Code § 50-1304, and the City has not 
rebutted this argument. As a matter of law, a plat in the state of Idaho is not required to depict 
access points between private property and the public roadways, so as a further matter oflaw, the 
Arnolds' access rights cannot be limited by a document which by its very design is not intended 
to address those rights. Moreover, also ignored by the City is the comparison that the Arnolds 
have made regarding the various lots within the Mountain View Subdivision. In particular, the 
City has avoided addressing how, if the subdivision plat was intended to or actually did govern 
access rights on the property, there could be any explanation for Lot 1, Parcel A or Parcel B.12 
Each of these parcels, as they exist on the subdivision plat, lack any noted access point, so 
according to the City's argument regarding the dominance of the subdivision plat in evaluating 
access rights, each of those parcels is landlocked until the City provides some sort of special 
permission to afford them access. This is not a supportable legal position in the state of Idaho. 
If a subdivision plat was intended to be a governing document for purposes of access 
rights in this state, the Idaho legislature would have included them within the "Essentials of 
Plats" in Idaho Code § 50-1304. Plats would, in that case, include a far greater amount of detail 
regarding specific points of access and, arguably, the City's engineers and officials would not 
approve of or affix their signatures to plats until all access points for the affected property were 
noted. The Court need not look any further than the Mountain View Subdivision plat, approved 
by the City of Stanley, to know that this simply is not the case. Respectfully, the Arnolds posit 
that the subdivision plat is silent on access for these lots because a subdivision plat is not the 
vehicle by which to determine access points. As argued throughout this Petition for Rehearing, 
12 AR, p. 94 
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long-standing Idaho law deems that the default access right between private property and public 
roadways is unrestricted absent existing regulation by the governing body. As such, for the City 
or the Court to restrict the Arnolds' access rights based upon a document that does not, by law, 
address or otherwise limit those rights, is unsupportable and constitutes legal error. 
On a related note, the Arnolds would be remiss to not respond to the City's contention 
that they have allegedly acknowledged the supremacy of the subdivision plat in establishing 
access rights to the affected property. 13 The City, ignoring the punctuation in the Arnolds' 
description of work for Building Permit No. 690R-2 and by a creative use of bold type, attempts 
to rearrange the scope of the Arnolds' earlier building permit (which was granted by the City) to 
suggest that the Arnolds have at some point conceded that access to the. various lots of the 
Mountain View Subdivision was intentionally limited by the plat. 14 Respectfully, this effort is 
misleading. While the City would have this Court read Building Permit No. 690R-2 as 
"construction of access roads ... to be installed per preliminary plat approval," the reality is 
that the permit actually says, "construction of access roads.i utilities, etc. to be installed per 
preliminarv plat approval . . . ."15 This is simply a matter of punctuation, and the plain 
language of Building Permit No. 690R-2 cannot be misconstrued in this manner. 
In view of the foregoing, the Arnolds respectfully contend that the Court committed legal 
error when it determined that the subdivision plat for the Mountain View Subdivision restricted 
or limited the Arnolds' vested right of access from their property to the public roadways. 
13 Response, p. I 0. 
14 Id. 
CONCLUSION 
15 It cannot go ignored in these proceedings that the City previously approved Building Permit No. 690R-2, which 
clearly discussed "access roads," without the various engineering and technical drawings and information that the 
City now claims are a requirement under the Stanley Municipal Code. This contradiction unavoidably illustrates the 
arbitrariness of the denial of Building Penn it No. 831, and that the so-called requirements that the Arnolds allegedly 
did not meet do not actually exist in the Stanley Municipal Code at the building permit stage. 
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In the proceedings on judicial review, as well as in. the briefing on this Petition for 
Rehearing, the City has continuously taken positions that lack support in law. First; the City 
-c:witenc:ied that a certain amo1.mt-0f technical. engineering info:nnationis- required for issu®ce of a 
. . 
building pennit. As is evident by the City's approval of Building Pennit No. 690R-2, and the 
complete absence of any such requ.irements in the S~nley Municipal Code. this position was and 
remains 1l11SUppe>rtable. Next. the City contended and the Court agreed that the Arnolds did not 
have a vested right of access from their property onto Ace of Diamonds Street, but the record 
W21$ and reilltiins devoid of any exercise of the City's police power to regulate that apeessright 
Finally; the City contended and the Court agreed that the Mountain View Subdivision plat 
#$6vemed access rights for the affected parcels .of property., 1:>ut neither IdallC> law nor tlie plat 
itself supports such a proposition. In sum; the City has failed to support its legal atguments with 
applicable law. The City has never adopted any regulations, withinits undisputed police powers, 
to limit a property owners' right of access to the abutting public roads. The A.molds' .resprotfu-I1y 
request a reheating of this matter so that the Court may reevalul:ite the propriety of the City's 
denial of Building Permit No. 831,. with recognition of the Arnolds' access rights and the City's 
lack of any estal:>li$hed regulations justifying its denfal. 
DATEDthls )~dayof0ctober~2015. 
Fredric V, Shoeri:iak;er / Thomas J. Lloyd JII 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER 
THOMAS ARNOLD AND REBECCA 
ARNOLD, HUSBAND AND WIFE, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
CITY OF STANLEY, A POLITICAL 
SUDIVISION OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No.: CV 2014-35 
PETITIONERS' REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO CORRECT THE 
RECORD AND MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
COME NOW Petitioners Thomas Arnold and Rebecca Arnold ("Arnolds"), by and 
through their counsel of record the firm of GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT P.A., and 
hereby submit this memorandum in support of their Motion to Correct the Record and in 
opposition to Respondent's Motion to Strike. 
ARGUMENT 
Respondent City of Stanley ("City") has asked this Court to strike the Motion to Correct 
the record on the grounds that it is untimely under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(1). The 
City's motion was not served with a Notice of Hearing, nor was it served with a Motion to 
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Shorten Time, though the Arnolds presume that the City intends to cali its motion for heari~g 
when the parties and the Court convene for the hearing on the Arnolds' Petition for Rehearing 
and attendant Motion to Correct the Record. As the City's motion was served so that it was 
received by counsel for the Arnolds with only six (6) days' notice, including a weekend, the 
Arnolds object to the City's motion as untimely under I.R.C.P. 84(0). 
Notwithstanding the foregoing objection, the City's Motion to Strike should be denied on 
the merits. The City has moved to strike the Arnolds' Motion to Correct the Record under the 
authority ofI.R.C.P. 84(1), which specifically pertains to Augmentation of the Record on judicial 
review. As is evident from the information presented to the Court with the Arnolds' Motion to 
Correct the Record, the fundamental problem in the current record is not a matter of what is in 
the record, but rather what is not in the record. In its briefing and argument submitted to this 
Court on Judicial Review of the City's denial of Building Permit No. 831, a number of 
statements were made by the City for which there is absolutely no support in the existing record. 
The City has made many statements through the course of these proceedings that the Arnolds, 
and specifically Respondent Rebecca Arnold, has engaged in systematic illegal conduct and that 
she did not follow the policies and procedures in place in the Stanley Municipal Code. As has 
been argued and demonstrated by the Arnolds on several occasions, there is absolutely no 
evidence in the record of the Arnolds ever having been accused, charged, or otherwise adjudged 
guilty of any sort of"illegal" conduct. Moreover, the City has repeatedly failed to identify where 
in the Stanley Municipal Code there is any legal support for the contentions by the City that there 
were procedures, of the sort advocated for by the City in these proceedings, that the Arnolds 
failed to abide by. Indeed, what the record actually contains are examples of instances in which 
individuals - these very Respondents - were issued building permits without the type of 
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information that the City now claims in this litigation to be necessary under the City's ordinances 
governing the application and issuance of building permits. 
Nevertheless, the City's statements appear to have influenced and impacted this Court's 
view of the Arnolds' position in this case, given that the Court's concluding remarks in its 
Decision and Order Re: Judicial Review of Building Permit Denial echoed the City's 
unsubstantiated claims against the Arnolds: "Had the Arnolds followed the established 
procedure before beginning construction, their setback would be limited .... " With respect to 
the Court, the Arnolds have demonstrated that the claims asserted by the City throughout the 
course of these proceedings are not supportable, either in fact or in law. 
Thus, in order to ensure that the Court is fully apprised of the true facts .on Rehearing, the 
Arnolds brought their Motion to Correct the Record under I.R.C.P. 84(0). Because the Arnolds 
have taken issue with how the record has been misconstrued, rather than what is contained in the 
record, a motion to augment the record (timely or not) would not have been the appropriate 
avenue to accomplish that which is sought by the Arnolds on their motion. As set forth by the 
City, itself, "review of agency action· shall be based upon the record created before the agency." 
(City's Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Strike, p. 2.) The Arnolds agree, and simply 
seek to have a fair hearing that is actually based upon the facts of record, and not any hyperbole 
or unnecessarily and inaccurately exaggerated rendition of those facts. Again, it is not the record 
that has presented this problem - it is the briefing and argument that has been presented well 
after the record was settled. As I.R.C.P. 84(1) and (n) are not applicable to the Arnolds' Motion, 
the City's Motion to Strike should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
As a final note, the Arnolds again reiterate that all they are seeking is a fair Rehearing of 
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this matter without the extraneous and overly-rhetorical accusations with which they have dealt 
through these,proceedin&s. Toe Arnolds merely seek to bring this litigation tJack to the record-
n.ot as misconstrued, by the Ci,cy~ but as actually set forth before the Court For those items not in 
· the record that the City would like to assert to the Court (focluding the aq~ument that the Arnolds 
do not have a right of access to Ace of I>iarnouds $treet from their property, which was neither 
address.ed nor decided by the agency from which this case of judicial review originates); the 
Arnolds respectfully object. In order to ensure the accuracy of the Court's understanding of the 
attendant Motion to Strike. 
DATED this .. $~ayof0ctober, 2015. 
Thomas J. Lloyd III 
Attorneys for Petition~rs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER 
THOMAS ARNOLD, ETAL, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 










) _______________ ) 
Case No. CV-2014-35 
MINUTE ENTRY 
The above entitled matter having come before the Court on this the 21st day of October, 
2015, for all pending matters, before the Honorable Alan C. Stephens, District Judge, in the Custer 
County Courthouse, Challis, Idaho. Thomas J Lloyd III, Esq. appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs. 
Paul J Fitzer, Esq., appeared on behalf of the defendant. Also present were Court Reporter Mary 
Ann Elliot, Chief Deputy Mike Talbot, and Deputy Clerk Crystal Kestler. 
The Court inquired of counsel. Mr. Lloyd made argued his pending motions. Mr. Fitzer 
responded and argued his pending motion. Mr. Lloyd gave rebuttal argument. 
Based upon the information stated by counsel; The Court will take both parties 
arguments under advisement and submit a decision at a later date. 
DATED AND DONE this ;y~ay of October, 2015. 
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~ ·4-. ~~
Alan C. Steph:~11s 
District Judge· ..•. 
1 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY Qi~a full, true and correct copy of the Minute Entry was personally 
delivered; faxed or mailed this~ __ day of October, 2015, to the following: 
Thomas J Lloyd III, Esq. 
Greener Burke Shoemaker PA 
tlloyd@greenerlaw.com 
Paul J Fitzer 
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CITY OF STANLEY, ) 
) 
) 
Defendant. ) __________ ) 
Case No. CV 2014-35 
DEClSION AND ORDER RE: 
MOTION FOR. ltEIIEAIUNG, 
MOTION TO COltRECf THE 
RECORD, A.ND MOTION TO 
STRIKE 
The Plaintiffs, Thomas and Rebecca Arnold, filed a motion for rehearing and a motion to 
coITect the record. The Defendant contests the motion. The Defendant filed a motion to strike. 
The Plaintiffs contest the motion. After reviewing all of the filings and holding a hearing on 
these matters, the Court HEREBY DENIES THE MOTION FOR REHEARING, THE MOTION 
TO CORRECT THE RECORD, and THE MOTION TO STRIKE. 
MOTION FOR REHEARING 
The Arnolds base their motion for rehearing on an accusation that the Court relied on 
false information in coming to its original conclusion and therefore must reconsider. 
This Court's original decision was made based on the standard set forth in Idaho Code 
§67..,5279. This standard requires the Arnolds to prove that the City of Stanley's denial of their 
building permit was in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions, in excess of the 
statutory authority of the agency. was made upon unlawful procedure, was not supported by 
substantilll evidence, or was arbitrary,. capricious, or an abuse of discretion. The Arnolds have 
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.... 
not proved that any of these occurred. Absent such proof, the Court was required to rule in favor 
of the City of Stanley. 
At the center of this Court's decision was the conclusion, against the Arnolds' contention, 
that the City of Stanley has rules regarding subdivisions that apply to the access road/driveway 
the ArnoJdsare attempting to get a building pennit for in this action. SMC §16.16. These rules 
require an application for the creation of a $Ubdivision to include all ''streets, street names, right 
of way and roadway widths, including adjoining streets or ro.adways." SMC §16.16.030.I. 
Additionally~ the rules require that the preliminary plat plan be in sufficient detail as to ·~enable 
the commi$Sjon to make a detennination as tp the coufonnance of the proposed improvements to 
applicable ~guiations, ordinances and stanWU'ds." SMC § 16.16.020.B. 
This Court concluded that these procedures are in compliance with Idaho law governing 
the improvement of property within the cit}\ and that the Arnolds failed to follow these 
procedmes when they began construction of the road in question in this action. In light of these 
ciroUil'.lStances; the City of Stanley has every rightto deny a building pennit in order to enforce 
those procedures. 
The ,t\molds argue that the Court relied on various facts and conclusions that are false in 
making its d«,ision and ask the Court to hold an additional hearing in order to sort through these 
facts. The Statemems of the Court that the Arnolds augue were made upon relying on false 
statements by the City are: (I) that the Arnolds had constructed a road in violation of applicable 
city ordinances, (2) that the case is about access roads, not a private driveway, (3) that the 
original plat 11,greement only allows for one access point to Lot 5, (4) that a huildingpennit is not 
the appropriate method for gaining approval for an access road. (5) that more infonnation 
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regarding the methQd to be used to build the road is required for the City Council to be able to 
mak;e the decisi()n, (6) that a plat amendment would be required in order to regain an access right 
to the abutting public road, and (7) that the a~ drive is constructed Qn city property. These 
statements are discussed below. 
In Statement I the Court stated that had the Arnolds waited to build the access 
road/driveway until they amended their plat plan -and obtained a valid buil~ing pennit, the loss 
they woukl bave suffered might not have been -substantial. The Arnolds do not deny that the 
building permit they sought was for a road not on the plat plan. They arg\le that because the plat 
plan was not submitted to the Court, the Court cannot come to that conclusion. However, that 
conchision was presented to the Court in argument and was not di:Jputed. Even in their current 
argwnents, the Arnolds do not claim that the road in question was part of the original plat plan. 
Since there is no evidence that the road was on the plat plan as it was required to be under SMC 
§16.16.030.I, the Arnolds were in violation of a city ordinance when they began construction of 
thatroad. 
In Statement 2, the Arnolds claim that the road in question is actually a driveway and not 
an access road even though the Arnolds referred to it as a road. This is irrelevant because the 
subdivision application requires -all streets and ri8hts of way to be inclu4ed in the preliminary 
plat. SMC §16.16.030.I. This Court interprets this to include all mea1,1s of~ to the property 
because storm drainage, public water and sewer systems, utility easements, pedestrian walkways, 
and street lighting will all be affected whether the road is an access road or a.driveway. Hence, 
the City has m1 interest in knowing about a.H driveways and other access points at the preliminary 
plat stage. 
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Statement 3 ·was a remark that the ,plat agreement only allowed for one access point to 
Lot 5. No evidence was provided to prove to this Court that Lot 5 originally had more or less 
than one acces:; point in the original plat agreement Since the Plaintiffs have the bitrden of proof 
u,nder the §67-5279 standard. it would be up to them to show the Court that this fact was not true. 
This Court rejects the argument that the parcel is entitled to an additi<mal ~ess. point simply 
beeaµse it abuts the city street. This Court does not deny the Arnolds any opportunity to have 
:access to the abutting street, but concludes that the Arn.old$ must follow the appropriate 
procedure in ord~r to gain that access. They have not done so here. 
Stattment 4, that a building permit is not the appropriate method for gaining approval of 
an access road (or driveway), is proven by a quick look at SMC §16.16.030.I,where it$Ues,that 
all streets in a proposed subdivision must be clearly· named and drawn on the preliminary plat. 
This is so the proposed a<}CesS point can be investigated and either approved or denied by the 
City Council and presented to various public agencies and the public by way of a hearing. Then 
an ultitnate, informed decision can be made as to whether the proposed street is in compliance 
with eity ordinances before approval is granted. Clearly, the addition of a street to a subdivision 
plan must be approved ip the same method as the ·n::st of the streets -0r it would deem the whole 
process arbitrary. The Court~ to this conclusi<:>n by ~ding the Stanley Mllllicipal Code. 
In statement 5 the Court stated that the City of Stanley has the right to request more 
infom,:ation before making its decision. The Stanley Municipal Code requires the applicant for a 
subdivision to provide "sufficient information and detail to enable the commission to make a 
determination as to confonnance of the proposed improvements to applicable regulations, 
ordinances and standards." SMC 16.16.020.B. Since the City has every right to request more 
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information regarding the construction of roads before approving a subdivision application, it 
must also have the right to request more information regarding a street that is being added to the 
original plan.. lhe Court interpreted the law to teach this conclusion. 
Statement 6 concludes that a plat amendment would be required in order to regain an 
·acc.ess right to the abutting road. The City of Stanley has set forth. several rules regarding the 
creation of a subdivision, one of those rules is that all streets and rights of way (interpreted to 
mean all accesS" points) must be divulged on the preliminary plat. The preliminary plat is then 
submitted to the City Council and. various public agencies and presented tp the public for input 
before being approved. If a change to the preliminary plat is not required to go through these 
steps, then the process is deemed meaningless and arbitrary. Itis essential that any change to the 
plat plan.must be put through the same scrutiny as the preliminary plat. 
Finally, statement 7 was .a remark that the access drive is constructed on city property. 
Ag~ this is irrelevant. The City of Stanley has power to regulate all property within the city 
and bas chosen. to regulate subdivisions in the ways proscribed herein. Idaho Code gives the City 
Of Stanley this power, which extends to private as well as public property. Therefore, reliance on 
this fact would not be detenninative. 
The Court finds that it did not rely on any "false statements.., by the City of Stanley in 
making its prior decision and, therefore, denies the motion for rehearing. 
MQTION TO CORRECT THE RECORD 
In a motion for judicial review of an agency action the Court is confmed to review the 
record as it stood when the agency made the decision. Any motion to correct the record should 
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have been filed long ago with the City of Stanley and cannot be considered by this Court. The 
Court, therefore, genies the motion to correct the. record. 
MOTION 'fO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO CORRECT THE RECORD 
Since the Court has denied the motion to correct the ,record, the Defendant's motion to 
strike the motion to correct the record is moot. The Court, therefQre, denies the motion to strike. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this b ~y of November, 2015. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE S'I'ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER 
THOMAS ARNOLD AND REBECCA 
ARNOLD, Husband and Wife, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
CITY OF STANLEY, a Political 
Subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-2012-142 
NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
FEE: $129.00 
FEE CATEGORY: L.4 
; ! 
.\,·1y 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, CITY OF STANLEY, ITS ATTORNEYS OF 
RECORD, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT, 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellants, Thomas Arnold and Rebecca Arnold 
("Appellants"), hereby appeal against the above-named Respondent, City of Stanley 
("Respondent"), to the Idaho Supreme Court from the following final disposition entered in the 
above-entitled action, the Honorable Alan C. Stephens, District Judge, presiding: 
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a. Decision and Order Re: Motion for Rehearing, Motion to Correct the 
Record, and Motion to Strike, entered on November 3, 2015, denying the Appellants' 
Motion for a Rehearing on their Petition for Judicial Review; and 
b. Decision and Order Re: Judicial Review of Building Permit Application 
Denial, entered on June 10, 2015, denying the Appellants' Petition for Judicial Review 
and restricting Appellants' property rights 
2. That the Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 
84(t), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 1 l(a)(l), Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3. Appellants intend to assert the following issues on appeal. By setting forth this 
list of preliminary issues on appeal, Appellants do not intend to restrict or prevent themselves 
from asserting other issues on appeal: 
a. Whether the District Judge erred in determining that Appellants do not 
have a right of access to/from their property at the point of intersection with the abutting 
public rights of way, in the absence of any regulatory restrictions? 
b. Whether the District Judge erred in determining that under Idaho law, all 
access points for a parcel of property (including those which are neither streets nor public 
rights of way, e.g. driveways) must be depicted on a preliminary plat? 
c. Whether the District Judge erred in concluding that the acceptance by the 
City of Stanley of a subdivision plat had the effect of nuilifying all other appurtenant 
property rights not shown on the plat, regardless of whether those rights are required to 
be shown on a plat according to Idaho Code§ 50-1304? 
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d. Whether the District Court erred in imposing municipal code requirements 
on the Appellants that are applicable to the establishment of subdivisions, in a 
subdivision that had previously been established, in conjunction with the Appellants' 
request for a building permit? 
e. Whether the District Court erred in treating Appellants' proposed 
driveway as a "right of way" or "street" for purposes of applying local and state laws? 
f. Whether the District Court erred when it found that Appellants were 
required to follow any particular procedure to "gain" access from the public roadways to 
their abutting private property, in the absence of any codified restrictions previously 
curtailing that appurtenant access right (see Johnston v. Boise City, 87 Idaho 44, 51, 390 
P.2d 291,294 (1964))? 
g. Whether the District Court erred in concluding that the Appellants had 
constructed an "access road" in violation of the Stanley Municipal Code? 
h. Whether the District Court erred in determining that the City of Stanley's 
denial of the Appellants' Building Permit Application No. 831 was not a decision made 
on unlawful procedure? 
4. To the knowledge of the Appellants, no order has been entered sealing all or any 
portion of the record. 
5. The Appellants request the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript in both hard copy and electronic format: 
a. May 20, 2015, 11 :OOam: Hearing on Petition for Judicial Review; and 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
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b. October 21, 2015, 11 :OOam: Hearing on Petition for Rehearing and other 
matters. 
6. Appellants request the following documents, together with their related exhibits, 
to be included in the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included in the Standard 
Record under Idaho Appellate Rule 28: 
a. Any and all documents filed and/or lodged with the District Court in this 
matter. 
7. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the court reporter 
from whom a transcript has been requested, as named below at the address set out below: 
Jack Fuller 
Court Reporter 
c/o Custer County Courthouse 
801 Main Street 
PO Box 385 
Challis, ID 83226 
b. That in accordance with Rules 24( c) and 24( d) of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules, Appellant has paid the sum of $200.00 to the clerk of the District Court for the 
preparation of the reporter's transcript; 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid; 
d. That the filing fee for filing this Notice of Appeal with the District Court, 
County of Custer has been paid; and 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
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DATED THIS trday of December, 2015. 
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A. 
L--~ 
By ,----J(.I~ 
Fredric V. Shoemaker 
Thomas J. Lloyd III 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ( rday of December, 2015, a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing instrument was served upon: 
Paul J. Fitzer 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
Jack Fuller, Court Reporter 
Custer County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 385 
Challis, ID 83423 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
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D U.S. Mail 
D Facsimile 
[8J Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Delivery 
D E-mail: pjf@msbtlaw.com 
D U.S. Mail 
[8J Facsimile 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Delivery 
Thomas J. Lloyd 
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(,t0"'49"f, ' 
Fredric V. Shoemaker (ISB No. 1687) 
Thomas J. Lloyd III (ISB No. 7772) 
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A. 
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 950 
Boise, ID 83702-6138 
Telephone: (208) 319-2600 
Facsimile: (208) 319-2601 
Email: fshoemaker@greenerlaw.com 
tlloyd@greenedaw.com 
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By: Crystal Kestler Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER 
THOMAS ARNOLD AND REBECCA 
ARNOLD, Husband and Wife, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
CITY OF STANLEY, a Political 
Subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-2014-35 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL TO 
THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
FEE: $129.00 
F:EE CATEGORY: L.4 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, CITY OF STANLEY, ITS ATTORNEYS OF 
RECORD, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT, 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above~named Appellants, Thomas Arnold and Rebecca Arnold 
("Appellants''), hereby appeal against the above-named Responden~ City of Stanley 
("Respondent"), to the Idaho Supreme Court from the following final disposition entered in the 
above-entitled action, the Honorable Alan C. Stephens, District Judge, presiding: 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APP:EAL TO THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT - 1 




a. Decision and Order Re: Motion for Rehearing, Motion to Correct the 
Record, and Motion to Strike, entered on November 3, 2015, denying the Appellants' 
Motion for a Rehearing on their Petition for Judicial Review; and 
b. Decision and Order Re: Judicial Review of Building Pennit Application 
Denial, entered on June 10, 2015, denying the Appellants' Petition for Judicial Review 
and restricting Appellants' property rights 
2. That the Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 
84(t), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 11 (a)(l), Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3. Appellants intend to assert the following issues on appeal. By setting forth this 
list of preliminary issues on appeal, Appellants do not intend to restrict or prevent themselves 
from asserting other issues on appeal: 
a. Whether the District Judge erred in detennining that Appellants do not 
have a right of access to/from their property at the point of intersection with the abutting 
public rights of way, in the absence of any regulatory restrictions? 
b. Whether the District Judge ened in determining that under Idaho law, all 
access points for a parcel of property (including those which are neither streets nor public 
rights of way, e.g. driveways) must be depicted on a preliminary plat? 
c. Whether the District Judge erred in concluding that the acceptance by the 
City of Stanley of a subdivision plat had the effect of nullifying all other appurtenant 
property rights not shown on the plat, regardless of whether those rights are required to 
be shown on a plat according to Idaho Code§ 50-1304? 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE IDAl@jUPREME COU.RT - 2 
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d. Whether the District Court erred in imposing municipal code requirements 
on the Appellants that are applicable to the esta.blishment of subdivisions, in a 
subdivision that had previously been established, in conjunction with the Appellants' 
request for a building permit? 
e. Whether the District Court erred in treating Appeilants' proposed 
driveway as a "right of way" or "street" for purposes of applying local and state laws? 
f. Whether the District Court erred when it found that Appellants were 
required to follow any particular procedure to "gain" access from the public roadways to 
their abutting private property, in the absence of any codified restrictions previously 
curtailing that appurtenant access right (see Johnston v. Boise City, 87 Jdaho 44, 51, 390 
P.2d 291,294 (1964))? 
g. Whether the District Court erred in concluding that the Appellants had 
constructed an "access road" in violation of the Stanley Municipal Code? 
h. Whether the District Court erred in determining that the City of Stanley's 
denial of the Appellants' Building Permit Application No. 831 was not a decision made 
on unlawful procedure? 
4. To the knowledge of the Appellants, no order has been entered sealing all or any 
portion of the record. 
5. The Appellants request the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript in both hard copy and electronic format: 
a. May 20, 2015, 11 :OOam: Hearing on Petition for Judicial Review; and 
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b. October 21, 2015, 11:00am: Hearing on Petition for Rehearing and other 
matters. 
6. Appellants request the following documents, together with their related exhibits, 
to be included in the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included in the Standard 
Record under Idaho Appellate Rule 28: 
a. Any and all docwnents filed and/or lodged with the District Court in this 
matter. 
7. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the court reporter 
from whom a transcript has been requested, as named below at the address set out below: 
Mary Ann Elliott 
Court Reporter 
c/o Jeffereson County Courthouse 
210 Courthouse Way, Suite 120 
Rigby, ID 83442 
b. That in accordance with Rules 24(c) and 24(d) of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules, Appellant has paid the swn of $200.00 to the clerk of the District Court for the 
preparation of the reporter's transcript; 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid; 
d. That the filing fee for filing this Notice of Appeal with the District Court, 
County of Custer has been paid; and 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
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DATED THIS 14th day of December, 2015. 
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A. 
By;:r/;f{frh 
Thomas J. Lloyd III 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 14th day of December, 2015, a true and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing instrument was served upon: 
Paul J. Fitzer 
MOORE SMITH BuxroN & TURCKE, CHTD. 
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
Mary Ann Elliott, Court Reporter 
Jefferson County Courthouse 
210 Courthouse Way 
Rigby, ID 83442 
D U.S. Mail 
D Facsimile 
[8'J Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Delivery 
0 E-mail: pjf@msbtlaw.com 
D U.S. Mail 
IZJ Facsimile: 208-745-6636 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Delivery 
;i;;;:l{Jfo-
Thom.as J. Lloyd 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL m!R_lfita Plummer 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER 
THOMAS ARNOLD and REBECCA ARNOLD, 
Appellants, 
Vs 
CITY OF STANLEY, a political subdivision 
of the State ofldaho, 
Respondent, 
CASE NO. CV-2014-35 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
OF APPEAL 
Supreme Court No. ___ _ 
Appeal from: Seventh Judicial District, Custer County, State ofldaho 
District Court Judge: Honorable Alan C. Stephens 
District Court No: CV-2014-35 
Order or judgment appealed from: Decision and Order RE: Motion for Rehearing, Motion to 
Correct the Record and Motion to Strike dated November 3rd, 2015; Decision and Order RE: 
Judicial Review of Building Permit Application Denial dated June 10th, 2015 
Attorney for Appellant: Fredric V. Shoemaker and Thomas J Lloyd III 
Attorney for the Respondent: Paul J. Fitzer 
Appealed by: Thomas and Rebecca Arnold through attorney, Fredric V. Shoemaker 
Appealed against: City of Stanley, a political subdivision of the State ofldaho 
Notice of Appeal filed: December 14th, 2015 
Filing Fees Paid: Yes 
Reporter's transcript requested: Yes 
Name of Reporter: Mary Ann Elliott 
Estimate of cost of transcript: No estimate in file 
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Supreme Court Case No. 43868 
-vs- CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
City of Stanley, a political subdivision 
of the State of Idaho, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
I, LURA H. BAKER, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District 
of the State ofidaho in and for the County of Custer, do hereby certify: 
That the attached list of exhibits are true and accurate copies of the exhibits being 
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal - District exhibits: NONE 
I. Amended Agency Record - (06-10-14) 
2. Audio CD listed as Exhibit B, filed with the Affidavit Of Cari Tassano - (07-
24-14) 
3. Audio CD listed as Exhibit C, filed with the Affidavit Of Cari Tassano - (07-
24-14) 
IN WITNESS......,~EREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court this~ day of February, 2016. 
LURA H. BAKER, Clerkofthe Court 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
278 
MARY ANN ELLIOTT, RPR, CSR 
Official Court Reporter 
Seventh Judicial District 
2184 Channing Way, Suite 208 
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**************************************************** 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
***************************************************** 
DATE: February ~2, 2016 
TO: Stephen W. ~enyon, Clerk of the Court 
Supreme Court/Court of Appeals 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101 
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO.: 43868 
DISTRICT COURT CASE NO.: CV-2014-35 
CAPTION OF CASE: Arnold v. City of Stanley 
You are hereby notified that a reporter's 
appellate transcript in the above-entitled and 
numbered case has been lodged with the District 
Court Clerk of the County of Custer in the Seventh 
Judicial District. Said transcript consists of the 
follow proceedings, totaling 135 pages: 
1. Hearing on Judicial Review of Building 
Permit Application Denial 
( May 2 0, 2015) 
2. Hearing on Motion for Rehearing, Motion to 
Correct the Record, and Motion to Strike 
(October 21, 2015) 
Respectfully, 
Mary Ann Elliott, RPR, Idaho CSR #1015 
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Thomas Arnold and Rebecca Arnold, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
-vs-
City of Stanley, a political subdivision 












Supreme Court Case No. 43868 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, LURA H. BAKER, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho in and for the County of Custer, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
Clerk's Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and 
is a true, full and correct record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required 
under Rule 28 of Idaho Appellate Rules along with all requested documents. 
I do further certify that the Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record will be duly 
lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
IN WITNESS Wl-{~REOF, I ereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at 
Challis, Idaho this J 3rtlay of , 2016. 
Cc: Clerk of the Court 
Idaho Supreme Court 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
280 
LURA H. BAKER 
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IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER 
Thomas Arnold and Rebecca Arnold, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
V. 
City of Stanley, a political subdivision 











Supreme Court Case No. 43868 
County Case No. CV-2014-35 
NOTICE OF LODGING OF 
CLERK'S RECORD 
Notice is hereby given that the Clerk's Record was lodged with the District Court 
on {ih~ ~3 , 2016. 
The parties shall have twenty-eight (28) days from the date of service of the appeal record to 
file any objections, together with a Notice of Hearing, with the District Court. If no objection is 
filed, the record will be deemed settled and will be filed with the Supreme Court. 
cc: Idaho Court of Appeals 
Idaho Supreme Court 
281 
LURA H. BAKER 
Clerk of the District Court 
coot{{ 
O\S1B\C1 cout'-l1'< .. . -\~ cus,E.R~o -, S'\\J, 
\Q\~L~ 
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IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER 
Thomas Arnold and Rebecca Arnold, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
-vs-
City of Stanley, a political subdivision 












Supreme Court Case No. 43868 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, LURA H. BAKER, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho, in and for the County of Custer, do hereby certify that I have personally served or mailed, 
by United States mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript to 
each .of the parties or their Attorney of Record, this JL\-1-:i;.y off ~'i:j , 2016 as 
follows: 
FREDRIC V. SHOEMAKER, ESQ. 
THOMAS J LLOYD III ESQ., 
950 WEST BANNOCK STREET, SUITE 950 
BOISE, ID 83 702 
PAUL J. FITZER, ESQ., 
950 WEST BANNOCK STREET, SUITE 520 
BOISE, ID 83702 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
LURA H. BAKER 
Cl 
Crystal Kestler, Deputy Clerk 
2.82. 
